Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Computational Model: In philosophy, a computational model is an assumption about the functioning of the mind that assumes similarities between thought and information processing in cybernetic systems. See also Computation, Cognition, Information processing._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nelson Goodman on Computer Model - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 143/44 The analogy with the computer model is ambiguous, because it has a referential and a computer related interpretation (the simulations). According to the latter it defines a sequence of states of the computer, the former enables the scientists to interpret it as a representation of physical states or physical reality. >Ambiguity, >Analogies. IV 144 Of course, the computer knows nothing of the referential interpretation. Accordingly, we would not know that a computer simulation represents a molecular interaction, if we only knew the computer available interpretation of it. IV 144f Questions about the truth value of sentences are inappropriate after the computer related reading. ((s) because the computer has no knowledge of the outside world.) IV 144f GoodmanVsFodor: Fodor's theory cannot explain how we know what new phrases represent nor what familiar phrases represent. The role of the lexicon has emerged to serve other purposes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Computer Model
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29